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In the essays which make up The Sovereignty of Good, Iris Murdoch 
gives us a picture of moral life in which ‘the metaphor of vision [is] 
almost irresistibly suggested’. This chapter aims to clarify the role 
played by the metaphor of vision in Murdoch’s philosophical 
thinking. I’ll examine two different things which might be meant 
by the term ‘moral vision’: vision of moral things or vision which is 
itself moral. The suggestion will be that whilst both capture 
something important about Murdoch’s work, each may mislead 
about what is distinctive in her views. For Murdoch, I shall suggest, 
there is no distinctively moral vision. There is only vision: a loving 
gaze directed upon the reality of others. 
. Introduction 
The first symposium of the  Joint Sessions of the Aristotelian Society and 
Mind Association took place on a Saturday morning at the University College 
of Wales in Aberystwyth. The title of the symposium was ‘Vision and Choice 
in Morality’ and the speakers were R.W. Hepburn and Iris Murdoch. 
Hepburn’s paper aimed to expand our conception of morality beyond those 
familiar judgements that involve a commitment to universalizability, one 
ought not to kill and so on. He takes seriously the idea that we aim to fashion 
 
our lives into meaningful patterns and argues that this project can itself be a 
genuine moral activity, even when it involves a richer and more personalised 
idiolect than the simple evaluation of one’s life against the yardstick of 
universalizable moral principles.1 Murdoch’s response is that of the radical 
comrade-in-arms rather than carping critic. She focuses on a contrast between 
those views which centre moral thinking around the notion of choice and 
those which centre it on the notion of vision. Hepburn is right, Murdoch says, 
to emphasise the fact that understanding, interpretation, and reflection play 
a role in moral thinking. But he is wrong to think of these as ‘merely 
preliminaries to choice’ (VCM ). There are moments when ‘what is needed 
is not a renewed attempt to specify the facts, but a fresh vision’ (VCM ). 
Moral differences are ‘differences of vision not of choice’ (VCM ). 
This symposium marked Murdoch’s first publication in moral philosophy.2 It 
was also the last piece she published in the mainstream of philosophy journals. 
It was not until the lectures and eventual publication of the three papers which 
make up The Sovereignty of Good that we were to see the full development of 
ideas hinted at in ‘Vision and Choice in Morality’ and a portrayal of moral 
life in which ‘the metaphor of vision [is] almost irresistibly suggested’ (IP 
/-). 
The aim of this chapter is to clarify the role played by the metaphor of vision 
in Murdoch’s philosophical thinking. It is a metaphor which runs through her 
writing from ‘Vision and Choice in Morality’ to Metaphysics as a Guide to 
Morals. My focus here will be primarily confined to the essays which make up 
The Sovereignty of Good. The suggestion will be that whilst there is no doubt 
that the term ‘moral vision’ captures something important about Murdoch’s 
work, it is an open question whether the phrase, with all its resonances, is 
helpful in capturing the view that Murdoch holds. For Murdoch, I shall 
suggest, there is no distinctively moral vision. There is only vision: a just and 
loving gaze directed upon the reality of others (cf. IP /). 
 
1 (Hepburn ) 
2 Her paper ‘Metaphysics and Ethics’ was presented on BBC Radio the year before but was 
not published until . 
 
Two bits of housekeeping before we begin. First, my focus in what follows 
will be the elucidation of Murdoch’s view. I will not attempt here to 
reconstruct her arguments for the claims she makes. This is in part because 
figuring out exactly what Murdoch thought is task enough. But it is also 
because there is a deep strand in Murdoch’s thinking which takes her picture 
of moral life to be recommended in part by what we are ‘irresistibly inclined 
to say’ (IP /). To this end, to show that what we are irresistibly inclined 
to say is not incoherent may already carry suasive force.3 
Second, the title of this chapter is ‘moral vision’ and it is metaphors of vision 
which dominate Murdoch’s work. But one might wonder whether the term 
‘moral perception’ is to be preferred and whether there are differences between 
vision and perception which counsel in favour of using one or the other.4 
Murdoch does sometimes use the term ‘perception’ when characterising her 
view—e.g. at IP /, SGC /—but it is the language of vision which 
predominates. I will comment briefly later in this chapter about possible 
differences between vision and perception which bear on the question of 
which to use in characterising Murdoch’s views but until then I will use 
Murdoch’s own terms without implication of a philosophically substantive 
contrast with some more general notion of moral perception. 
. Moral Vision 
Murdoch’s views on the role that vision plays in moral thinking need to be set 
against the background of her wider philosophical commitments. Let me 
mention three. 
First, Realism. The world contains such properties as kindness, foolishness, 
mean-spiritedness, and so on. These properties are a genuine part of reality—
and someone who comes to know about such properties comes to know 
something about how things are in reality.5 It follows, for Murdoch, that we 
must have a notion of ‘nature’ which is broad enough to encompass these 
 
3 Cf. Philosophical Investigations, § and § on theses in philosophy. 
4  Many discussions of Murdoch’s views use the more general term, e.g. (Blum ), 
(Holland ), (Clarke ), (Clifton ), (Panizza ). 
5 See, especially, IP -/-; OGG -/-; SGC /. 
 
features as natural, an implication of which, Murdoch thinks, is that certain 
etiolated scientistic conceptions of the natural must be rejected.6 
Second, Knowability. We are sometimes in a position to know about these 
aspects of reality. And that means that we possess a way of coming to know 
about these features.7 The notion of ‘coming to know’ here involves both a 
theoretical and practical component. It has a theoretical component, since in 
coming to know about someone’s mean-spiritedness, I come to know 
something about how things are laid out before me. And it has a practical 
component since, for many of these features, knowing how things are laid out 
will involve coming to know what is to be done. When we know how things 
stand with regard to these features of the world, the knowledge we gain is 
both theoretical and practical.8 
Finally, Concept Involvement. Our awareness of these aspects of reality is 
mediated by the concepts which are available to us. A subject’s conceptual 
scheme—understood in a maximally wide sense to include her whole outlook, 
ways of thinking, background beliefs and so on—can determine which 
aspects of reality a subject is able to pick out. Different schemes of concepts 
will enable subjects to pick out different aspects of reality, and shifts in our 
conceptual schemes may shift, either negatively or positively, the range of 
things which we are able to pick out.9 
These three commitments are unified by Murdoch’s notion of loving 
attention.10 Attention, for Murdoch, is the process by which we come to see 
the world for how it really is. To attend to things is to look at them lovingly 
and justly. And it unifies Murdoch’s three commitments. Attention allows us 
knowledge of reality; such knowledge can compel us to act in a certain way; 
 
6 See e.g. IP -/-. 
7 Cf. (Austin ) on the propriety of the question ‘How do you know?’ when faced with a 
claim to knowledge. 
8 See, especially, IP /; OGG /. 
9 See, e.g., IP /- and (Gomes ) for discussion. One important issue, which I won’t 
discuss here, is how Murdoch’s realism is to be made compatible with her emphasis on 
conceptual involvement—or, as is sometimes put, how Murdoch can secure objectivity given 
the role that subjective outlooks play in moral vision. See (Antonaccio ), (Blum , 
-), (Diamond ), (Panizza ) for discussion. 
10 See the chapter on ATTENTION elsewhere in this volume. 
 
and it is shaped by the conceptual schemes we operate within. This final point 
explains why loving attention can be improved. We can change the concepts 
we use when attending to others and to attend lovingly is to aim at perfection 
as regulative ideal.11 
Where does moral vision fit into this picture? In ‘Vision and Choice’, 
Murdoch uses the metaphor of vision in two connected ways. She first picks 
up on Hepburn’s discussion of an individual’s ‘vision of a good life’ (VCM 
) and uses the metaphor when referring to that broad ethical outlook—the 
‘total vision of life’ (VCM )—against which we take our life to have some 
sort of meaning or pattern.12 But by the end of the essay she has moved to 
talking about our status as ‘moral beings… immersed in a reality which 
transcends us’ and moral vision is now purposed to describe an ‘awareness of 
this reality and submission to its purpose’ (VCM ). 
These two uses of the metaphor of vision need not be connected. Higher 
education institutions liberally pepper their websites with statements of 
outlook and vision but these carry no implication of there being a reality of 
which our universities are aware. The suggestion of ‘Vision and Choice in 
Morality’ is that there is a connection in the case of the moral thinking of 
human agents. Someone’s outlook, in the sense of the background ways in 
which she makes sense of the world, can precisely be an outlook, one which 
thereby makes available to her some stretch of the world. Murdoch takes this 
idea to have Platonic heritage (F&S, ).13 And the essays in The Sovereignty 
 
11 See especially IP -/-. Murdoch makes a further claim, which she takes to be of 
central importance, that the change in our concepts which tends towards perfection also tends 
towards privacy. See IP -/ and cf. VCM -. It is a delicate question how this 
tendency towards privacy coheres with her commitment to realism and not one I shall pursue 
here. 
12 See M&E , , VCM f,  
13 Justin Broackes (,  fn.) cites Republic VII c as an example of Plato’s imagery of 
moral vision. Another example is at Republic VII b-c: ‘In the knowable realm, the form 
of the good is the last thing to be seen, and it is reached only with difficulty. Once one has 
seen it, however, one must conclude that it is the cause of all that is correct and beautiful in 
anything, that it produces both light and its source in the visible realm, and that in the 
intelligible realm it controls and provides truth and understanding, so that anyone who is to 
act sensibly in private or public must see it.’ 
 
of Good extend, develop, and deepen this connection. Moral vision is an 
awareness of reality shaped by the scheme of concepts with which we operate. 
So much in broad brushstrokes. But how are we to understand the details of 
this picture? Why should visual metaphors be so natural in developing this 
account and how should we understand their use? I want to pursue this 
question by means of a distinction between two senses of the term ‘moral 
vision’. It is a term which is ambiguous in a number of ways but the 
distinction I want to pursue is that between moral vision as vision of moral 
things and moral vision as vision which is itself moral. Let me elucidate each 
in turn.14  
First, there is moral vision as vision of moral things. This way of using the 
term is comparable to the way in which developmental psychologists talk of 
‘object perception’ or the way in which evolutionary theorists talk of ‘predator 
perception’. These pick out particular capacities—the capacity to perceive 
objects, the capacity to perceive predators—which are supposed to be 
perceptual in some interesting way and which play an important role in 
certain explanatory projects. On this first disambiguation, moral vision is 
simply the capacity to perceive some aspect of the moral domain, a capacity 
which Murdoch alights upon to explain certain aspects of our moral lives. 
Second, there is moral vision as vision which is itself moral. Here the natural 
comparisons are ‘blurry vision or ‘fleeting perception’. Blurry vision is not 
vision of things which are blurry and a fleeting perception is not perception 
of a fleeting. On this second disambiguation, moral vision is vision which is 
moral in some way and Murdoch’s use of the term would connote a 
willingness to expand the objects of moral evaluation to include such 
processes as the visual activity involved in looking at another person. These 
two different ways of understanding the term ‘moral vision’ might each be 
 
14 Cf. Margaret Holland’s distinction between moral perception and moral attention (, 
pp.-) and the related distinctions drawn in (Panizza , ) and (Clifton ). 
(Blum ) makes some further helpful distinctions, including the important contrast 
between perceptual language which entails that things are as they are perceived to be and 
perceptual language which does not, a contrast which elsewhere might be marked by a 
distinction between factive and non-factive verbs. 
 
used to explicate Murdoch’s use of visual metaphors. We will consider them 
in turn. 
. Vision of Moral Things 
Let us start with the idea that moral vision is vision of moral things. This view 
takes moral vision to be analogous to, say, colour vision. Just as colour vision 
involves seeing things as coloured, moral vision involve seeing things as 
possessing moral features. Recent discussions of moral perception have tended 
to use the term in this way.15 And applied to Murdoch, the idea would be that 
her use of visual language evinces a commitment to the thought that 
perception presents us with moral features of the environment and that a well-
placed individual can use such perception to come to know something of the 
moral situation in which she finds herself. 
It is important to note that someone who uses the term ‘moral vision’ in this 
way is not committed to the claim that moral vision picks out a determinate 
of the determinable perception. The claim is not that we have, in addition to 
the five familiar senses, some additional moral sense. For one can possess a 
capacity to perceive some objects or features of the environment without the 
results of exercising that capacity being a way of perceiving the world. This is 
important because there is no suggestion in Murdoch that we have some 
special moral way of perceiving the world, nor does she express sympathy for 
those views in the history of moral philosophy which might naturally be 
understood as involving an additional moral sense.16 The first suggestion is 
not, then, that Murdoch believes in the existence of a moral sense but only 
that she is committed to our being able to perceive moral features of the 
world. 
Even at this level of generality, we can see why this idea might be a helpful 
way to understand Murdoch’s overall picture. Perception in general presents 
us with features of our environment and it is by presenting us with features 
 
15 E.g. (Audi ), (Cowan a), (Werner ). 
16 Murdoch’s emphasis on the perceptual aspect of moral vision contrasts notably with the 
emphasis on emotions and feelings in Hutcheson’s (, ) account of moral sense and 
with the intellectual aspect of apprehension stressed by Price’s () form of ethical 
intuitionism. 
 
of our environment that it puts us in a position to know about those features. 
Thus, if perception presents us with moral features of the world, then moral 
vision can be a source of knowledge, exactly as Murdoch holds. And since we 
ordinarily think of perception as presenting us with some aspect of reality, the 
suggestion accords with Murdoch’s insistence of a moral reality. Most 
importantly, since perceptual experiences can in general be shaped by our 
beliefs, desires, knowledge, and moods, there is room for someone who takes 
perception to present us with moral features to allow that our scheme of 
concepts determines the character of any such moral vision. This captures 
Murdoch’s insistence on the connection between one’s general outlook or 
scheme of concepts and the things that are available to be seen. Just as the 
visual experiences of the ornithologist will differ from that of the bored 
suburbanite, so too will the visual experiences of the kind-hearted differ from 
those of the selfish toad.17  
This first sense of ‘moral vision’ thus looks well-placed to capture much of 
what Murdoch wants from her use of visual language. But it is too literal in 
its understanding. According to this first reading, when Murdoch use visual 
imagery, she means to draw our attention to the fact that perception can 
present us with the moral features of situations just as it can present us with 
colours, shapes, objects, and so on. This no doubt captures something of the 
way in which Murdoch urges us to broaden our conception of the things of 
which we can become aware.18 But it sits ill at ease with Murdoch’s repeated 
insistence that her use of visual language is metaphorical: 
Further, is not the metaphor of vision almost irresistibly suggested 
to anyone who, without philosophical prejudice, wishes to describe 
the situation? Is it not the natural metaphor? (IP /-, my 
emphases) 
What is needed is a reorientation which will provide an energy of a 
different kind, from a different source. Notice the metaphors of 
orientation and of looking. (OGG /, my emphasis) 
 
17 See (Cowan b) for the application of this idea to moral perception and (Siegel ) 
for support for the general thesis. 
18 See (VCM -) on the data of moral theorising. 
 
The first suggestion takes Murdoch to hold that perception presents things as 
having moral features just as it presents us with things as having colours. But 
this looks like a refusal to take her at her metaphorical word. 
How seriously should we take Murdoch’s claims to be speaking 
metaphorically? Seriously, I think. Murdoch had careful things to say on the 
use of metaphors throughout her writings. In her first published paper, 
‘Thinking and Language’, she emphasises the ineliminable use of metaphors 
in characterising our thoughts and experiences.19 And at the start of ‘The 
Sovereignty of Good over Other Concepts’ she writes, in the context of the 
metaphor of vision specifically, that: 
it seems to me impossible to discuss certain kinds of concepts 
without resort to metaphor, since the concepts are themselves 
deeply metaphorical and cannot be analysed into non-metaphorical 
components without a loss of substance. (SGC /) 
Murdoch’s views on the ineliminability of metaphors mean that we should 
not expect to be able to replace her metaphor of vision with something less 
metaphorical. But nor should we treat it as a biological claim about the visual 
system. 
Consider, then, a less literal version of the first suggestion. One might agree 
that moral vision is vision of moral things without taking this to be a claim 
about the content of perceptual experiences. An alternative is to read 
Murdoch’s use of visual language as pointing to the fact that we are sensitive 
to the moral features of the world. Since perception is, in general, a form of 
sensitivity—a receptive capacity, as Kant puts in at the start of the Critique of 
Pure Reason (A/B)—the fact that we are sensitive to the moral features of 
the world would explain the naturalness of using perceptual language when 
characterising the nature of that sensitive capacity. But we can say this without 
ascribing to her the view that perception itself literally presents us with moral 
features of the world. 
 
19 See T&L . 
 
This metaphorical version of the first suggestion retains the advantages of its 
more literal cousin. Sensitivity in general may be thought of as a mode of 
knowledge directed on something external. It can be shaped by one’s 
upbringing, character, wider outlook, and so on. And imaginative exercises 
might help in extending the range of things to which we are sensitive. This all 
fits with Murdoch’s claims, including her insistence on the importance of 
imagination in determining our vision.20 And it gives us a promising way to 
develop the first reading: moral vision is a sensitivity to the moral 
requirements which are imposed in certain situations and the deliverances of 
this sensitivity are a kind of knowledge, one which can spur the sensitive soul 
to action without any process of inference. This reading explains the features 
of Murdoch’s account whilst making clear precisely why the visual metaphors 
are so appropriate. 
Something like this general picture is endorsed by John McDowell and both 
the influence of Murdoch on McDowell and the tendency to read Murdoch 
through the lens of McDowell’s important and influential framework have 
made it tempting to ascribe this view to Murdoch.21 McDowell’s own account 
goes beyond these initial commitments in ways which look especially 
amenable to an understanding of Murdoch. McDowell holds that sensitivity 
to moral requirements is a character trait and thus that virtue itself just is 
sensitivity to moral requirements (McDowell , -). This fits well with 
Murdoch’s insistence on the importance of the virtues when characterising 
our awareness of reality (e.g. SGC /, /-). And McDowell insists 
that this conception of virtue is motivated by the uncodifiability of moral 
principles just as Murdoch claims that the good cannot be ‘taped’, that it 
always lies beyond our capture (OGG /). 
The idea that moral vision is vision of moral things thus gives us a pleasing 
way to understand the relevance of visual imagery to Murdoch. The metaphor 
of vision is appropriate because we are sensitive to the moral features of 
 
20  On imagination, see IP / and cf. her comments on Hampshire and imagination in 
DPR (-) and the discussion in (Altorf , ch.) and (Clarke , §V). 
21 For McDowell’s views see especially (McDowell , ). Bridget Clarke (, ) 
helpfully sets out the commonalities between McDowell and Murdoch. (McNaughton ) 
and (Chappell ) offer related ways of avoiding the overly literal reading. On McDowell’s 
relation to Murdoch, see (Broackes , -, -). 
 
situations; because this sensitivity allows knowledge of the moral domain; and 
because such sensitivity is shaped by the concepts we possess and the 
imaginative processes we undertake. But complications arise when we 
consider the second sense of ‘moral vision’. We turn to that next. 
. Vision that is Moral 
On the second way of disambiguating the phrase, moral vision is vision which 
is itself moral, just as accurate vision is vision which is itself accurate. One 
way to understand this view is as expanding the domain of moral evaluation 
to include such things as our activities of looking, listening, and so on. 
Applying this second sense of the term to Murdoch, the claim would be that 
Murdoch’s visual imagery showcases her commitment to the claim that inner 
activities are just as important as outer actions when it comes to moral life.22 
How can vision itself be moral? Consider the role that effort and imagination 
play for Murdoch in our achieving accurate vision: 
I can only choose within the world I can see, in the moral sense of 
‘see’ which implies that clear vision is the result of moral 
imagination and moral effort. There is also of course ‘distorted 
vision’… (IP /) 
Freedom is not strictly the exercise of the will, but rather the 
experience of accurate vision which, when this becomes appropriate, 
occasions action (OGG /, my emphasis; cf. IP -/, 
/). 
These passages connect clear and accurate vision with moral imagination and 
moral effort. The kind of clear and accurate vision which occasions action is 
one which requires effort and imagination.  
Why should moral effort be expended in bringing about clear and accurate 
vision? Murdoch traces failures of vision back to ‘the fat relentless ego’, to 
 
22 See especially (IP -/) for material in this vein. Margaret Holland’s focus on moral 
attention can be seen as a way of emphasising this second sense of moral vision. See her (, 
pp.-). Clifton () makes a forceful case for the importance of this aspect of 
Murdoch’s view. Cf. (Bommarito , ch.) for a recent defence of the idea that episodes of 
attention can be morally assessable independently of their connection to overt action. 
 
‘mechanical energy of an egocentric kind’ (OGG /), to ‘personal 
fantasy’ and that ‘tissue of self- aggrandizing and consoling wishes and dreams 
which prevents one from seeing what is there outside one’ (OGG /). 
Elsewhere she adds ‘[o]bsession, prejudice, envy, anxiety, ignorance, greed, 
neurosis, and so on…’ (F&S ).23 These things distort our vision, they 
form a falsifying veil (SGC /) which prevents us from seeing the world. 
If we are to see what is really there, we need to undergo a process of 
purification (OGG /) or ‘unselfing’ (SGC /) and find an 
alternative source of energy which counteracts the egocentric energy provided 
by personal fantasy. This is difficult and unending. Accurate vision is moral 
vision because it is a moral achievement.24 
These passages suggest that the second sense of ‘moral vision’ captures 
something important about Murdoch’s use of visual imagery: moral vision is 
vision that is itself moral and vision is moral when it is the result of effort and 
imagination. On this way of understanding Murdoch’s visual imagery, her 
intent is to draw out an analogy between the way in which our visual 
awareness of the world can be blocked and the ways in which we can fail to 
know how to behave. Social convention, fantasy, the ego—these get in the 
way of our knowing what to do just as a blindfold prevents us from seeing 
what is there to be seen. The removal of these obstacles can be a moral 
achievement, and in this sense it is appropriate to talk about vision which is 
moral.  
This give us, then, an alternative way to understand Murdoch’s use of visual 
imagery. How does it compare to the first suggestion—that moral vision is 
vision of moral things? The two look compatible. As P.F. Strawson once 
emphasised, sensitive capacities in general are subject to disabling condition 
which prevent their operation (, ). So one might take Murdoch’s use 
of visual metaphors to involve both connotations: we are sensitive to the 
 
23 See (Holland ) and (Clarke ) on the barriers posed by ‘social convention and 
neurosis’ (S&G ) and cf. Kant’s comments on the barriers posed by the ‘dear self ’ 
(Groundwork :) and the ‘dishonesty, by which we throw dust in our own eyes’ (Religion 
:). 
24 On the need for an alternative source of energy, see Justin Broackes’ insightful comments 
on the analogies between grace and the energy obtained by attending to the Good (, -
) and compare the role that the fire plays in Murdoch’s wonderful reading of Plato’s allegory 
of the cave (SGC /-). 
 
moral realm and the accuracy or otherwise of that sensitivity is dependent on 
the displacement of certain egocentric occluders, a displacement which takes 
moral effort and imagination. Someone who takes this view will understand 
Murdoch as holding that we are sensitive to the moral domain; that our 
sensitivity to the moral domain is determined in part by our scheme of 
concepts; that the deliverances of this sensitivity occasion (theoretical and 
practical) knowledge; and that there are barriers to such sensitivity, most 
notably our egocentric energy, which must be overcome in order for our 
capacity for moral vision to present us with aspects of reality. 
But this concord underplays, I think, the tensions between the first and 
second senses of ‘moral vision’. For the question is not just whether Murdoch 
thinks there can be barriers to accurate vision—that much should be common 
currency—but whether Murdoch’s use of visual metaphors evinces a 
commitment to our possessing a sensitivity to the moral domain or whether 
it commits her only to the importance of moral effort and imagination in 
achieving accurate vision. And there are some passages which support the 
latter interpretation at the expense of the first. 
 Consider the following striking passage: 
All just vision, even in the strictest problems of the intellect, and a 
fortiori when suffering or wickedness have to be perceived, is a moral 
matter. The same virtues, in the end the same virtue (love), are 
required throughout, and fantasy (self ) can prevent us from seeing 
a blade of grass just as it can prevent us from seeing another person. 
(OGG /) 
Murdoch claims here that the same barriers prevent us from seeing a blade of 
grass as prevent us from seeing another person. The same idea comes up when 
she notes the distorting effects of the ego in our experience of the natural 
world.25 If accurate vision of the natural world is also a moral matter, then 
vision is moral wherever and whenever it requires the suspension of fantasy. 
It matters not whether it is vision centred on a moral realm. 
 
25  See especially the discussion of the kestrel at SGC /. (Clifton , -) 
discusses the passage from OGG. 
 
What should we say about this tension? It looks to rest on a disagreement 
about the objects of moral vision. The first reading holds that moral vision is 
vision of moral things; the second holds that it is vision which is itself moral. 
The two views come apart because vision can be moral without it taking 
something moral as its object. This suggests that if we want to decide between 
them, we need to consider what Murdoch says about the objects of moral 
vision. 
What is it we see when we see clearly? The objects of attention are, for 
Murdoch, individuals, prime amongst them people with their own distinct 
histories and idiosyncrasies. This is why ‘the central concept of morality is ‘the 
individual’ thought of as knowable by love’ (IP /). A good man must 
know ‘most obviously the existence of other people and their claims’ (OGG 
/, my emphasis). Murdoch’s view, she tells us, is one which ‘connects 
morality with attention to individuals, human individuals or individual 
realities of other kinds…’ (IP -/).26 
As an aside, and to make good on a promise from earlier: this view about the 
objects of attention may explain Murdoch’s use of visual language specifically 
rather than perceptual language more generally. For we ordinarily and with 
good reason take the objects of vision to be particular individuals, including 
amongst them other people. This is not true of all forms of perception. Many 
have thought that the primary objects of audition are sounds such that if we 
hear, for instance, the children in the garden it is only in virtue of hearing the 
sounds that they make. Vision is special in that we do not ordinarily think of 
it as presenting us with objects of visual awareness which are distinct from 
ordinary individuals and by means of which our awareness of individuals is 
mediated.27 And that makes it especially appropriate as a model for the kind 
of attention to individuals which Murdoch means to recommend.28 
 
26 See also the way that recognition of ‘the separateness and differentness of other people’ 
(OGG /) occasions right conduct and the claim that the word ‘attention’ expresses ‘the 
idea of a just and loving gaze directed upon an individual reality’ (IP /, my emphasis). 
27 See (Martin , -). 
28 Especially appropriate but not uniquely so, since touch is also ordinarily understood as 
taking individuals as objects. Imagine a version of Murdoch which emphasised the way in 
which we are held by the Good. On the absence of tactile metaphors in Murdoch, see 
 
How does this view about the objects of attention bear on Murdoch’s use of 
visual metaphors? The individual realities to which we are related extend 
beyond anything which might naturally be characterised as constituting a 
moral realm. This might be thought to undermine the idea that moral vision 
is vision of moral things specifically. But this is too fast. The most plausible 
form of the first reading holds that Murdoch’s use of visual metaphors 
commits her to our possessing a sensitivity to moral requirements and one 
can endorse this claim without taking it that moral requirements are a 
distinctive object of awareness to be contrasted with blades of grass and other 
people. One might instead hold that our awareness of individuals is properly 
characterised as a sensitivity to moral requirements in virtue of the way in 
which we are aware of individuals. In particular, one might think that our 
sensitivity to individuals is to be characterised as sensitivity to the moral 
domain not because of its objects but because of the concepts at play in our 
awareness of these objects. 
These two things—the objects of awareness and the concepts which structure 
our awareness—can only be artificially separated for Murdoch. ‘Moral 
concepts’, she tells us, ‘do not move about within a hard world set up by 
science and logic. They set up, for different purposes, a different world. (IP 
/). So one might accept that the objects of attention are individuals but 
hold that attention to such individuals can be characterised, for Murdoch, as 
a sensitivity to moral requirements because of the concepts we bring to bear 
in such attention. The idea here would be that moral vision is vision of moral 
things because of the concepts we use when attending to individual realities. 
And once we make this move, the distinction between the two ways of reading 
Murdoch starts to blur. On the first reading, Murdoch’s use of visual 
metaphors is supposed to draw out our sensitivity to moral requirements and 
the way such sensitivity occasions knowledge. In contrast, the second reading 
takes it that Murdoch’s use of visual metaphors is supposed to draw out the 
way in which certain features—the ego, social convention, perhaps others—
act as occluders for the kind of clear and accurate vision which occasions 
action. These views look to disagree on the objects of moral vision. But once 
 
(Cordner ) and compare the discussion of Buber’s critique of  the ‘hegemony of sight 
over the other senses’ (Buber , ) in MGM (f ). 
 
we recognise the role that Murdoch accords to our scheme of concepts in 
determining our awareness of reality, both can agree that the objects of vision 
are individual realities, that our awareness of those realities is determined by 
the scheme of concepts with which we operate, and that the process of finding 
the right scheme of concepts is a difficult one which requires the overcoming 
of competing pressures. Moral vision is moral, it might be said, because it 
involves finding the right ways in which to think of the world. 
. Perfect Vision 
This would be an irenic point at which to stop. We opened with a distinction 
between two different ways in which one might understand the term ‘moral 
vision’: as vision of moral things or as vision which is itself moral. And we 
have seen a way of understanding Murdoch’s use of visual metaphors which 
draws on both senses. The point of the visual imagery, on this irenic view, is 
to draw out the way in which overcoming the barriers to accurate vision 
requires us to find the right ways to think about other individuals. It is only 
by finding the right way to think of individual realities that we can come to 
see our moral requirements and thereby be moved to appropriate action. 
But once we push this line of thought to its natural conclusion, the term 
‘moral vision’ begins to look misleading. For it is central to both of the 
readings we have been considering that there is some explanatorily significant 
distinction between the moral and the non-moral. On the first reading, this 
is because Murdoch is committed to our having vision of the moral domain. 
And on the second, it is because Murdoch is committed to accurate vision 
being the result of moral effort and imagination. But Murdoch’s commitment 
to our possessing a sensitive capacity for knowledge need not and should not 
be cashed out in a way which takes the distinction between the moral and 
non-moral to carry load-bearing weight. Or so I’ll suggest. 
Consider first vision of moral things. We have seen that Murdoch’s metaphors 
of vision draw out the way in which we are sensitive to individual realities and 
the ways in which that sensitivity is determined by our scheme of concepts 
and occasions immediate action. For this view to involve vision of moral 
things it would have to be the case that the forms of thinking which are 
 
involved in seeing the world aright require the deployment of specifically 
moral concepts. Is this the case? 
The answer is found in Murdoch’s account of moral concepts, set out most 
clearly in ‘The Idea of Perfection’. It is a view on which our grasp of concepts 
changes over time. The possibility of change brings with it, Murdoch thinks, 
the possibility of improvement such that changes in the grasp of a concept are 
governed by a regulative ideal of perfection. A perfect scheme of concepts is 
one which enables a true vision of individual realities. This is why we have to 
connect ‘the idea of the individual and the idea of perfection’ (IP /). 
And since vision under the right scheme of concepts can call forth action 
(OGG /), the awareness which is enabled by the right ways of thinking 
results in knowledge which is both theoretical and practical.29 
Vision improves as our concepts tends towards perfection. Which concepts 
are governed by this standard? Although Murdoch introduces the connection 
between the idea of the individual and the idea of perfection with reference 
to ‘moral concepts’ specifically (IP /), she quickly develops the idea in 
a way which belies the initial restriction: 
My view might be put by saying: moral terms must be treated as 
concrete universals. And if someone at this point were to say, well, 
why stop at moral concepts, why not claim that all universals are 
concrete, I would reply, why not indeed? Why not consider red as 
an ideal end-point, as a concept infinitely to be learned, as an 
individual object of love?  (IP /-) 30 
For Murdoch, all concepts aim at perfection, even those of mud, hair, and 
dirt (SGC /). This is one sense in which her view can be described as a 
form of Platonism. And it suggests that those perfect concepts which are 
 
29 See especially (IP -/-, -/-) and the discussions in (Setiya ) and 
(Clarke ). Note that nothing in Murdoch excludes the possibility of a deterioration in 
our scheme of concepts though she thinks the possibility of renewal is always available (VCM 
-). 
30 On concepts as concrete universals, see (Bagnoli ), (Merritt , -) (Clarke 
, -). 
 
required for accurate vision cannot be restricted to some distinctively moral 
subset.31 
Murdoch’s account of concept-possession thus implies that the kind of 
description which allows true vision is not description which is specifically 
morally inflected. Consider the discussion of the mother and her daughter-
in-law. Improvement occurs when the mother begins to think of her 
daughter-in-law as spontaneous, gay, reasonably youthful (IP /). Seeing 
things properly requires finding the right way to think about things but these 
ways of thinking may be as ordinary as you like. It is a mistake to take 
Murdoch’s use of visual metaphors to show that she takes us to have vision of 
moral things or that we need to possess some set of distinctively moral 
concepts in order to achieve true vision. There is only and always the difficult 
task of finding the right concepts with which to think of others and thereby 
coming to see them aright.32 
Turn now to vision which is itself moral. Murdoch’s metaphors of vision draw 
out the barriers to our sensitivity, barriers which can be overcome only by 
finding the right ways to think about other individual realities. Does the effort 
involved in overcoming these barriers make the resulting vision distinctively 
moral? Murdoch does talk of the moral effort and moral imagination involved 
in unselfing (e.g. at IP /) and she characterises the process as one which 
involves trying to see not only accurately but also justly and lovingly (IP 
/). Does this suffice for vision itself to be moral? 
Murdoch explicitly connects the effort, love, and justice required for true 
vision to the infinite perfectibility of the process (IP -/-). And it is 
this ideal of perfection which introduces a dimension of evaluation for visual 
awareness, one whose ubiquity later forms the basis for Murdoch’s ontological 
 
31 One might express this as a claim about the ubiquity of moral thought—as in (Diamond 
, )—but only if we have some independent grip on what the moral amounts to 
here. (Setiya , ) points out how Murdoch’s claims here go beyond anything standardly 
understood by Williams’s introduction of thick concepts (Williams , -). 
32 (Setiya , ) makes this point explicitly. This is another point at which Murdoch’s 
view differs from more recent ‘moral perception’ views. 
 
proof of the existence of Good (MGM f.).33 The effort and imagination 
required to dismantle the barriers to vision, and the virtues which someone 
who makes such effort thereby exemplifies, are to be understood in light of 
the better vision which they allow rather than the other way around. It is not 
that moral effort and imagination confer moral status on the resulting vision 
but that a just and loving gaze confers a standard upon the work which goes 
into establishing it. Murdoch’s view is not one on which the domain of the 
morally assessable is extended to include inner activities but one on which the 
ideal of perfection sets a standard of evaluation on the effort involved in 
achieving it. Vision is not moral but rather ideally perfect. 
These points are related. Murdoch’s initial philosophical interventions are in 
the philosophy of mind: on the structure of thinking, the reality of mental 
phenomena, the connections between mental phenomena and the ways we 
describe them. Her work in moral philosophy shares this focus: ‘The Idea of 
Perfection’ starts by tracing the ‘inarticulate moments of modern ethics’ back 
to problems in the ‘philosophy of mind’ (IP /). We get a proper sense of 
our lives as moral beings when we get clear on the nature of thinking in 
general and not moral thinking specifically, at least so long as the latter is 
supposed to pick out something which is a subset of the former.34 Seeing other 
individuals properly involves finding the right ways to think about them and 
that, in turn, requires overcoming our egocentric preoccupations. But these 
ways of thinking and these states of awareness are not distinctively moral. 
Murdoch’s use of visual imagery, then, connects two ideas: that we have a 
scheme of concepts, a background way of making sense of the world, and that 
we are sensitive to a reality which contains things in it which are picked out 
by those concepts. This connection is important because the sensitivity which 
is enabled by a perfect set of concepts is one which allows us a true vision of 
how things, one which can call us to action. And the sensitivity enabled by a 
perfect grasp of concepts can be blocked, not least by our own egocentric 
motivations. The dismantling of these barriers requires a source of alternative 
energy, one which can help us perfect our ways of thinking and see what is 
 
33  Cf. (MGM , , ) on the ubiquity of evaluation and the chapter on THE 
ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT in this volume for consideration of Murdoch's discussion of the 
ontological proof. 
34 See, e.g., (IP /). 
 
there to be seen. Murdoch’s visual metaphors are helpfully employed in 
picking out this family of views because they emphasise the knowledge-
conferring nature of this capacity and the knowledge-disabling nature of 
certain interactors with this capacity. But we misunderstand the picture if we 
take it to involve vision of moral things, the deployment of specifically moral 
concepts, or the conferral of a moral status on vision itself. To spell out the 
picture in these ways is to place too much weight on the distinction between 
the moral and non-moral and to ignore the way in which all our thinking 





DPR  The Darkness of Practical Reason 
F&S   The Fire and the Sun 
IP   The Idea of Perfection 
M&E  Metaphysics and Ethics 
MGM  Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals 
OGG  On ‘God’ and ‘Good’ 
SGC   The Sovereignty of Good Over Other Concepts 
T&L  Thinking and Language 
VCM  Vision and Choice in Morality 
 
For the three essays (IP, OGG, and SGC) which make up The Sovereignty of 
Good, references are given both to the Routledge Classics edition (London: 
Routledge, ) and to the reprints in Existentialists and Mystics, ed. Peter 
Conradi (London: Chatto & Windus, ). The references to VCM are to 
the initial publication in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary 
Volume  ():-. The references to MGM are to the Chatto & Windus 
edition, . All other references are to the papers collected in Existentialists 




35 My thanks to Casey Doyle, Cathy Mason, and Silvia Panizza for comments on an earlier 
version of this essay. 
 
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